



## **REGIONAL PROGRAM OF ACTION FOR PEACE AND SECURITY**

### **SUB-PROGRAM OF ACTION FOR JOINT SECURITY MANAGEMENT OF COMMON BORDERS**

**PROJECT NUMBER 1.1.3**

### **DEVELOPMENT OF BORDER ZONES AND PROMOTION OF HUMAN SECURITY**

**Final Version: 21 September 2006**

**ORIGINAL: ENGLISH**

## 1. The Political Context: A Situational Analysis

Border zones continue to constitute threats to the region, states and communities of the GLR. Core in these are cross border attacks by armed groups and bands of cattle rustlers, smuggling, motor vehicle thefts, drug trafficking, flows of small arms and now threats of terror networks. The foregoing has transformed borders into crush points of conflicts. Underlying this are several factors: The border spaces are made ideal by existing obstacles to accessibility (terrain, forests, deserts). They constitute ideal sanctuaries on either side of the frontiers.

The net effect has been endemic violent conflicts that generate not only refugees but also conflicts through the very presence of refugees. The region has had to endure genocide, and millions lost in war and post-war related deaths, influx of small arms, and cross border pastoralist conflicts and extreme levels of poverty. It is notable that conflicts in the GLR revolve around contestation over the idea of the state (ideologies around which state politics are organized), physical base (population and resources) and institutional framework of the states. That the states face vulnerabilities and threats despite their endowments in natural resources points to the inability to maximize on what Hernando de Soto calls dead capital<sup>1</sup>. This is capital whose existence we may not be aware of/ have forgotten or have never unraveled ways of adding value to it for effective use. This ranges from unexploited potential in its pastoralist resources in zone 3 to huge eco-tourism, agriculture and human resources prevalent in Zone 1<sup>2</sup>.

Underlying the inability of the states to activate these for productive purposes is the absence of infrastructure and security to facilitate movement of goods and services within the region. Self help efforts by states have failed to resolve this contradiction. Instead they have generated security dilemmas and complexities. Under the former, every action of an actor is viewed with suspicion and elicits an immediate counter reaction. Complexities are also a function of communities living across the frontiers, multiple threats and actors and internal vulnerabilities. What is notable in border zones is the artificiality of the frontiers. Most of these have split communities making it impossible for them to move their goods and services across especially when conflicts emerge. Given the constancy of conflicts and poor infrastructure border zones do not attract both local and foreign investments either. The net effect is that border zones despite the presence of resources are also the most underdeveloped. The constancy of conflicts makes it impossible for states on their own to initiate development in these zones. The

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<sup>1</sup> The concept of dead capital is better captured by De Soto in his narrative of an Indian merchant who travels around the world in search of imaginary treasure only to return home old, sad, and defeated without it. His attempts to get water are constrained by his now silted well. Warily, he decides to dig a fresh one only to instantly strike a Golkonda, the world's largest diamond mine. The moral in the story is that African Leaders need not wander the world's foreign ministries and international financial institutions seeking their fortune. In the midst of their own regional frontiers, poorest neighborhoods and shanties, there are acres of diamonds—trillions of dollars, ready to be put to use if only they can unravel the mystery of how assets are transformed into live capital. Accordingly, dead capital exists because we have forgotten about it or have never unraveled ways of converting physical assets into capital such as using a house to borrow money to generate finance for an enterprise. See De Soto Hernando, *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else*, Black Swan, 2000, p. 35.

<sup>2</sup> See IC/GLR Project, no. 1.1 Joint Security Management of Common Borders.

IC/GLR has acknowledged these dynamics in border zones and therefore proposed a border security management framework. The reality of the matter is, however, that security cannot just be created through cooperation structures alone<sup>3</sup>. Rather it is a function of reducing border specific vulnerabilities. This implies the transformation of conflict engendering variables into security generating variables for state, regional and community socio-economic and political reproduction. In the GLR security revolves around the question of how states can enhance structural penetration in border zones to allow development and human security. Given the dynamics of the threats and the prevailing internal vulnerabilities, such a process can only take place through a regional approach to development.

## **2 Specific Problem to be addressed**

The questions this project seeks to address are: What state, regional and human security generating economic projects can be evolved in the GLR to transform border conflict clash points into socio-economic and security zones? What would be the appropriate strategy for constructing them?

## **3. Objectives**

The overall objective of the project is: State, community and regional security is enhanced through economic activities in the GL zones/ triangles through local-regional development efforts. The project seeks to explore border zones for state, regional and human security. In specific terms, its objectives are to:

- a) Initiate and implement regional, state and human security engendering economic projects for conflict resolution and state construction.
- b) Build capacity for the realization of security generating border economic zones.

### **3.1 A review of border security management frameworks**

Several border security generating options are operational in the GLR region. They include state based self help efforts geared towards assuring border security through border patrols; the increasing attempts at co-operations to monitor borders and the far reaching right of pursuit granted to Uganda by the Sudan. There is also the “Border Seal”, a border security strategy implemented by Uganda on its northern frontier in a bid to contain the LRA menace. This revolved around the construction of roads in the border zone to facilitate penetration, troop movement and ability to shuffle security complements. Clearly, all these options are state based. None seeks to maximize on the dead capital in the border zones with the view to using the existing economic potential of the zones to promote regional, state and community security. The fact that they emphasize physical security of the state, without responding to underdevelopment, means that they are hardly long lasting. Further to that they are unlikely to incorporate

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<sup>3</sup> This is in reference to the IC/GLR project no. 1.1 Joint Security Management of Common Borders, which proposes the setting up of a regional security architecture based on joint security management of common borders.

human and material resources remaining un-activated at community and state levels, such as role of communities in assuring state security, and the potential of military medical and engineering units in state human security development. The failure to incorporate these components explains the inability of the state to mobilize active border community cooperation in strengthening human and state security in border zones. Where the state is able to get some cooperation, the same is limited to the communities under its jurisdiction. Effective management of frontiers however calls for mutual co-operation of cross border communities.

### **3.2 Of the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration and Common Regional Public Goods Regional Framework**

The Heads of State and Government from the Great Lakes Region met in Dar-es-Salaam in November 2004 and signed the Dar-es-Salaam declaration committing them to principles on peace, security, democracy and development in the region<sup>4</sup>. Most important is the initiative to set up a “Special Reconstruction and Development Zone” (SRDZ). Such a zone would strengthen efforts geared towards a regional security structure for prevention, management and peaceful settlement of conflicts. The initiative would offer opportunities for applying common regional policies, measures and mechanisms for enhancing good neighborliness and multi-sector cooperation. The Dar-es-Salaam Declaration notably outlines a vision for border security management for sustainable peace and development in the region.

Putting the Dar Declaration into practice therefore calls for the development of a collective security framework that addresses security concerns of the state, communities involved, and the region by utilizing the so-called dead capital in border zones. Meaningful security strategies must also seek to improve on livelihoods, in order to remove the basis for deprivation and grievances that trigger and sustain conflicts. Adoption of such a perspective demands regionalized development frameworks that transform dead capital in border zones into productive regional assets. It should allow groups across frontiers and the respective administrative structures to cooperate and plan together for a commonly shared regional space.

The starting point is in restructuring of state-centric foreign and security policies, and embarking on concerted institutional and organizational efforts that can enable countries to collectively utilize and maximize resources in the region. This sharing of perceptions on problems and solutions, provides a foundation for the evolution of Common Public Regional Goods (CPRG) approach.

Public goods here are recognized as values and assets whose benefits cannot be confined to a single beneficiary. Once provided public goods are enjoyed by many. They generate many benefits, just as their misuse generates negative consequences. In the entire GLR, these include human resources that are not utilized in a manner so as to add value or activate their actual potential. For instance the huge potential that exists

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<sup>4</sup> See Dar es Salaam Declaration On Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes: 20 November 2004.

in military establishments to help in infrastructure construction. Military also has capacity to help in the fight of H.I.V/ AIDS pandemic given its outreach capacity. The fact that they are under-utilized in spite of existing un-employment in border zones and poor infrastructure makes them become dead capital. Others include pastures, water, security and markets. Transformation of this dead capital into live capital through provision of security and infrastructure would enhance tourism potential, environmental protection, and security, effective use of land, and livestock, fish and honey, and fruit production in the entire region.

Under the CRPG there is need to go beyond looking at frontier spaces and dead capital in them as they are and instead think about them in terms of what they can be. An example from triangle 12 (Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi): The Rusumo triangle illustrates this point<sup>5</sup>. The triangle lacks electricity yet the potential for production exists on the Rwandan side of the river. On the Burundian section, there exists a sugar factory that can take in the cane produce from peasant farmers across the Tanzanian and Rwandan frontiers. Such an arrangement within the triangle would add value to the resources here while at the same time creating new ones. National parks and forests on the frontiers for instance are national assets but they are unlikely to be effectively managed and their security assured unless there is cooperation between the neighboring states and communities. However when the states in the zone opt to manage them collectively, provide security, add investments, collective marketing and facilitate mutual access they become regional goods and serve everybody.

The application of the Common Regional Public Goods approach demands the evolution of an organizational framework at one level, and collective investments at another in a given regional triangle. The value of this approach is that it allows interactions that cut across the borders, generations and population groups. To the extent that regional public goods limit consumption based rivalry and exclusion, they form the basis for entrenched interdependency and long-term stability. They also have the net effect of entrenching trust among state by transforming points of conflict to sources of collective goods.

#### **4. Project Rationale**

Even if the states wish to evolve border security management succeeds it is unlikely to contain cross border community conflicts and enhance security unless human insecurity is addressed. No state can provide human security in zones whose very interactions involve cross border movements and affinities. The complexity of the situation comes in when groups struggle over resources. The Dar-es-Salaam Declaration, in acknowledging this reality, sets out the intention by calling for joint border security management and special zones for economic reconstruction. This project complements and reinforces IC/GLR project no. 1.1 on Joint Security Management of Common Borders by focusing on spaces for security generating economic activities. Its purpose is to illustrate how mobilizing existing dead capital can be used to promote sustainable

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<sup>5</sup> See IC/GLR Project 1.1 Joint Security Management of Common Borders.

development of border zones. These activities are complementary to the macro economic regional projects that emphasize the supra-national elements in particular the concept of transborder development basins.. They seek to bring in the local component in the reconstruction of the region. They can be effectively constructed by states belonging to a given triangle or zone or by a given state as long as the local -regional focus is maintained.

## **5. Strategies for Operationalizing the Project**

### **5.1 Dynamics of the Zones and Areas**

Border security can be improved by initiating security enhancing economic activities within zones. In the case of GLR, such activities should be initiated within 12 zones as stipulated in the Protocol on Non-Aggression, Mutual Defence, Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts among the States of the Great Lakes Region<sup>6</sup> and as described in IC/GLR project no 1.1 on Joint Security Management of Common Borders. These are Zone 1 (Uganda, Rwanda and DRC), Zone 2 (Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania), Zone 3 (Uganda, Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia), Zone 4 (Sudan, Uganda and DRC), Zone 5(Sudan, CAR and DRC), Zone 6 (RoC, DRC and CAR), Zone 7 (DRC, RoC and Angola), Zone 8 (DRC, Zambia and Angola), Zone 9 (Tanzania, DRC, Burundi and Zambia), Zone 10 (DRC, Burundi and Rwanda), Zone 11 (Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda) , Zone 12 (Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi).

#### **Zone 1: Zone Volcano (Uganda, Rwanda and DRC)**

This region has a rich potential in tourism, agriculture, large human resource component and other natural resources. It however lacks developed infrastructure that can facilitate access. Lack of deep state penetration, expanding populations, HIV/AIDS, and other resultant human insecurities make it impossible for nation states on their own to enhance security. One obvious economic means of enhancing security in the zone is the setting up of eco tourism and a tri-frontier national park that will benefit the three states.

#### **Zone 2: EAC-Lake Sango Triangle (Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania)**

This region is rich in water resources. Other resources here include human and fish. A large part of the population around the lake has no access to fresh water. Tanzania has just initiated a project that seeks to tap water from the lake for domestic use. Much of the population around the lake is equally poor. The Kenyan and Tanzanian regions lack adequate infrastructure such as road networks and electricity. The lake retains a high potential in tourism too as well as for hydro electric production as one of the measures for effective control of river flooding in the lake basin. Such measures and maximization of the agricultural and transport potential in the region and on the lake respectively would reduce poverty. Enhancement of infrastructure and provision of energy would transform the current virtually dead capital in form of fishing industry, farming, human resources, energy potential, transport, tourism into productive capital.

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<sup>6</sup> See Protocol for specific geographical extensions of the designated zones.

### **Zone 3: The Kapototur<sup>7</sup> Cradle of Man Triangle (Uganda, Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia)**

North-Eastern Uganda, North-Western Kenya, South Eastern Sudan and South-Western Ethiopia continue to be characterized by contestation among pastoralist groups whose logic for socio economic reproduction revolves around movement in search for pasture and water alongside with extreme levels of cattle predation. Absence of state presence, socio-economic infrastructure and influx of small arms has fueled violent conflicts in the region. Cross border raids and predation have increased in intensity costing lives and loss of economic livelihoods<sup>8</sup>. The entire triangle is characterized by lack of socio-economic infrastructure. Communities here lack social amenities. Security assets are thin on the ground. Their situation is compounded by lack of adequate communication networks.

Yet the region has dead capital in form of tourism, livestock, minerals, honey harvesting and agriculture. The long-term stability of the triangle calls for increased state penetration in the areas of law and order, infrastructure, political and legal institutions and economic infrastructure. The private sector is unlikely to be interested in initiating economic activities in this region unless it is highly compensated by the states. Its tourism potential has been undermined by poaching.

Stability and development in the region will also dependent on collaboration of the states in the triangle with Ethiopia. Without dealing with border security, the triangle further runs the risk of being used as a conduit for terrorist activities.

If seen in the context of the entire region, encompassing Eastern Africa including the Southern Sudan whose conflicts flow in to both Uganda and Kenya, planned post conflict reconstruction would offer a great opportunity for the region. Notable post conflict reconstruction based on common regional goods is the best way to raise both resources and to prevent fresh conflict outbreaks. Indeed such projects can help evolve region centric infrastructure for economic development. A rail system linking Acholiland in Uganda to Southern Sudan and to Lokichoggio and Nakuru in Kenya, and another line connecting Nanyuki with Addis Ababa and back into Southern Sudan would transform the entire zone. So would the construction of road networks along similar lines and borders, irrigation canals linking the lakes and river systems here with the Nile, the construction of bore holes, dams and schools. The foregoing would facilitate tourism, farming and state penetration.

### **Zone 4: The West-Nile Triangle (Sudan, Uganda and DRC)**

This area has a large potential for commercial agriculture e.g. rice, cotton and tobacco growing. The region is well served by the Nile River. It is interesting to note that whereas 90% of the Egypt's population depends on the Nile and thousands and thousands of

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<sup>7</sup> Reference to Karamojong, Pokot, Toposa and Turkana tribes.

<sup>8</sup> A detailed description of the dynamics in zone 3 is provided in IC/GLR project no. 1.1.2 "Disarmament of Armed Pastoralists and Promotion of Sustainable Development in Zone 3".

acres have been irrigated in Sudan with the help of the Nile including Gezira scheme, no similar projects have been undertaken by Uganda and the southern part of Sudan. Improved conflict management demands that the three states extend their reach to the societies in this triangle by building communication, administrative, political and law and order infrastructure. Such investments must be complemented by economic infrastructure that can maximize on the dead capital existing here. Dead capital here includes the Nile waters minerals, the fishing potential along the DRC–Uganda frontier on Lake Albert and the existing but under-utilized farming potentials. There is enough water here to facilitate irrigation. There is enough manpower to help construct rural access and border security roads. The aim is to increase the capacity and level of earnings and therefore lower the inclination to take up arms. The entire region is fertile.

### **Zone 5: The River Oubangui Corridor (Sudan, CAR and DRC)**

This zone is also characterized by lack of penetrative communication infrastructure. The Zone has a huge agricultural potential that can be enhanced by utilization of water from the Oubangui River. Its tourism potential has been weakened by poaching activities. There are only 8 security posts along DRC-CAR border. CAR has 1200Km border with Sudan. Like the frontier with DR Congo, CAR has had to deal with refugees and infiltration of small arms from Sudan. It is notable that there are only three border posts on CAR-Sudan Border<sup>9</sup>. Business activities here are constrained by lack of road networks.

### **Zone 6: Equator Triangle (RoC, DRC and CAR)**

This zone is forested and thus endowed with timber products. It has a huge population of wild life a factor that makes it a high potential area for tourism. It also has huge water resources that indicates its potential for agriculture.

### **Zone 7: The Atlantic Triangle (DRC, RoC and Angola),**

The states in this zone are on their way to recovery after civil wars. Several activities in this triangle point to potential for development. Existing accords allow frontier citizens of the three states movement without visas. Among the dead capital here is unutilized agricultural potential, tourism and oil. The zone is also rich in minerals. Yet it lacks the necessary infrastructure including school and health facilities. Undermining economic activities are landmines planted during the civil war.

### **Zone 8: The Benguela Corridor (DRC, Zambia and Angola)**

Apart from lack of infrastructure the frontier is hardly policed. It is an expansive area without penetrative infrastructure. There is unutilized farming potential in the area. All that is needed here is the tapping of water from neighboring rivers to facilitate farming,

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<sup>9</sup> See CAR, International Conference on Great Lakes Region, TTTF, Peace and Security. answers to questionnaire.



construction of schools and roads. Rural electrification from the Inga dam can also help to transform the zone.

### **Zone 9: Lake Tanganyika Corridor (Tanzania, DRC, Burundi and Zambia)**

It is characterized by long borderlines of both land and lake. The lake offers a great potential for tourism and fish industry. Agricultural potential also exists. The region can produce cotton and food crops. Lack of penetrative infrastructure denies populations to access markets. The zone is, however, affected by refugee flows, armed groups and landmines particularly along Burundi's frontier with Tanzania<sup>10</sup>. Social services are also lacking.

### **Zone 10: Zone CEPGL (DRC, Burundi and Rwanda)**

This zone is equally fertile though it lacks effective infrastructure. Expansion of the electricity production here can transform the region. The zone is rich in agriculture and natural resources. An equally critical problem is that of landmines along the Ruzizi River which constitutes the border with DRC<sup>11</sup>. These will have to be removed if the productive potential of the area is to be utilized.

### **Zone 11: The Kagera Triangle (Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda)**

This zone is a high potential area for agriculture if the rivers here are harnessed. It has a high potential for tourism, beef, and hides production given the parks and its rich potential in ranching related activities.

### **Zone 12: The Rusumo Triangle (Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi)**

The triangle has a huge potential in areas of tourism, agriculture, especially sugar production. Sugar production is taking place in the Rutana region of Burundi. The industry has the potential of serving peasant farmers in both Tanzanian and Rwandan sides of the triangle. It equally has potential in the production of hydro-electricity on the Rwandan side of the Rusumo River which can transform the triangle. Tanzania can add value to the triangle by helping to demine thus facilitating free movement of goods and services. The zone also has the potential of producing a regional manpower resource that is quadri-lingual. Here some peasants can speak Kiswahili, Kinyarwanda/ Kirundi, English and French. The emerging stabilization process in Burundi should help in increasing stability in this triangle.

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<sup>10</sup>See Burundi: IC/GLR: Peace and Security: answers to the questionnaire. And Rwanda: Peace and Security Questionnaire.

<sup>11</sup> See Burundi IC/GLR: Peace and Security: answers to the questionnaire. And Rwanda: Peace and Security Questionnaire.

## **5.2. Strategy**

### **Project Operationalization**

Three types of projects are envisaged: Border Security Roads (BOSERs), Border Security Economic and Environmental Networks (BOSEENs) and Border Security Social networks (BOSSONs).

#### **5.2.1 Border Security Roads (BOSERs)**

The first core project will revolve around the building of border security roads (BOSERS) across the common frontiers. They should be constructed in such a manner that they can also serve as air strips in order to enhance air surveillance. These will have the immediate net effect of creating jobs and fostering stakeholder mentality among the communities in the triangles. It will also have the immediate effect of increasing state penetration while enhancing frontier economic collaboration and security management. To build these roads we envisage the use of military engineering units from the region and the thousands of demobilized soldiers, and un-employed youth. Roads are critical to facilitating movement of different social categories including women who engage in cross border business activities.

Underlying the use of the military, is the simple fact that it avails capacities that literally lie under-utilized despite the fact that they cost the states to train (human elements) and to buy (physical assets). On average military establishment costs states an estimated 3-4 % of their GDPs. The use of private sector components in some of these volatile zones is likely to cost a fortune given insurance cost.

#### **5.2.2 Border Security Economic and Environmental Networks (BOSEENs)**

The second type of projects will revolve around the construction of economic regenerating and environment sustaining activities. Among these are activities such as the building of market shelters, irrigation canals, boreholes, dams, roads, environmental protection i.e. reforestation. These elements are critical to addressing issues of marginalization especially of women, most of who engage in small cross border businesses. Re-forestation and other environment protection activities will allow endangered forest communities to survive.

#### **5.2.3 Border Security Social Networks (BOSSONs)**

These will revolve around construction of social infrastructure such as schools, health facilities, water boreholes and housing units for security personnel and other citizens willing to settle in the triangle points.

While BOSERs are critical for the entire zones, the BOSEENs and BOSSON construction will be decided by the states at individual, bilateral and tri-lateral levels. Like the BOSERs, the core units to spear head the process will be military engineering battalions and thousand of un-employed youth and demobilized soldiers. Benefits

accruing will include, the creation of a disciplined manpower, imparting of skills to thousands of youth, increased state penetration and creation of a stakeholder security enhancing mentality in the border zones.

## **6. Capacity and Assets for Border Security Management**

This should be seen in two perspectives: Capacity of asset structures and unit assets. The first category has to do with material and financial components that are needed to be put in place to institutionalize the structures. Components like heavy-duty tractors, tippers can be acquired through development partner support.

Unit assets will involve the deployment of engineering units, opening up of training and accommodation camps for demobilized soldiers and un-employed youth. Cost here will involve salaries and allowances, costs of feeding the units. These will however reduce as states re-deploy resources from public works to these work brigades. At a later stage, these units will not only acquire skills for the benefit of society, but will also help to enhance security against terrorism and trafficking activities.

In terms of institutional management, Economic security triangles will be operated under the Z-CONSECs, while BOSERS will be managed by the A-CONSECs.

## **7. Challenges and opportunities for setting up of Economic Border Security Zones**

There may be objections against the use of military in economic activities, yet this is the most effective use of a dead capital that is frequently instrumentalized to cause conflicts. Military eats up an average of 4% of the GDPs in the region. It has the best personnel and capital equipment that goes to waste for lack of use.

Political will is going to be needed to overcome this resistance. The argument here should be that developing border zones using demobilized soldiers and un-employed youth is a promising path for a reduction on the demand side of small arms. Financial costs are apparent at the level of capacity building. While development partners can help in the initial phase of these processes, states can take up the costs once the cooperation mechanisms are in place.

## **8 Valued Added and Beneficiaries**

The value of border security economic zones lies in the fact that they can be set up immediately to help enhance penetration of the zones and to create a sense of ownership and economic regeneration in the zones. At an operational level, they will allow the evolution of closer relations between security forces and communities for regional, state and human security purposes. More specifically, the initiation of such projects would enhance border security management. Underlying this is the fact that they enhance state penetration while allowing communities to join the state in help to provide security in the zones, given the fact that they will be beneficiaries of such

developments. In this sense, the project complements IC/GLR project no. 1.1. on Joint Security Management of Common Borders especially the security enhancing BOSERs.

- ◆ The first core beneficiaries are communities living across frontiers. It will allow them to cooperate and add value to their common resources while ignoring artificial divisive borderlines.
- ◆ The states will benefit through increased community based security generating economic activities. It will also increase its tax base, while reducing the costs of insecurity.
- ◆ Another category of beneficiaries are groups of demobilized individuals and unemployed youth who will be engaged in these construction activities. They will have an opportunity to earn income and learn skills.
- ◆ State military institutions will gain experience in peace building.
- ◆ More important cross border income activities and BOSEENs will benefit women allowing them to better access boreholes, income generating activities and easy transport.
- ◆ Infrastructure will also enable the state to enhance its reach in the society while equally allowing it to add value to its human resource factor.
- ◆ Local authorities will also be able to generate income.
- ◆ The project allows international development partners to participate in regional activities such as supra-national environmental protection that benefit groups across frontiers.

## **9. Budget Issues**

Financing of these projects can be done by utilizing two core sources: the states and international development partners. States can tap on normal resources allocated to these regions. States can also regard these zones to be special to the extent of granting them additional funds for reconstruction. Construction of BOSERs for instance falls within the security needs of the state. If they are complemented by funds allocated to the Ministry of Public Works, such roads would be constructed with ease.

Given the current interest in the GLR, it is possible for the 11 states in the IC/GLR initiative to launch an international appeal for such zone specific economic initiatives for security. The fact that there are a total of 12 zones means that there is enough room for different development partners to engage with local partners in supporting the multiple initiatives under this project proposal.

## List of Abbreviations:

BOSEENs	Border Security Economic and Environmental Networks
BOSERs	Border Security Roads
BOSSONs	Border Security Social networks
CEPGL	Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs
GLR	Great Lakes Region
IC/GLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
CPRG	Common Public Regional Goods
H.I.V/ AIDS	Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
Gvt	Government
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
SRDZ	Special Reconstruction and Development Zone
A-CONSEC	Area Conference on Security
AU	African Union
CAR	Central African Republic
CEPGL	Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
IC/GLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
RoC	Republic of Congo
USD	United States Dollar
TTTF	Technical Thematic Task Force
Z-CONSEC	Zonal Conference on Security

## V. Result Framework, Workplan and Budget (Version of 21 September 2006)

<b>Project Title:</b>	<b>Development of border zones and promotion of human security in the Great Lakes Region</b>													
<b>Overall Objective :</b>	State, community and regional security is enhanced through economic activities in the GL zones/triangles through local-regional development efforts.													
<b>Intended Outcome:</b>	Local regionalized security generating economic zones													
<b>Outcome indicator:</b>	Enhanced economic production and goods availability in border zones.													
<b>Partnership Strategy:</b>	This project will support envisaged and existing informal structures for border security management and other existing formal structures for peace keeping and conflict prevention, as well as those devoted to economic regeneration and development (e.g. CEPGL, IGAD, and NEPAD). It complements the Special Reconstruction and Development Zone objectives of the IC/GLR through its micro-logic approach and should seek close cooperation and links with activities in the Transborder Development Basins.													
Expected results	Indicative Activities	Calendar								Resp. Partner	Foreseen Budget (Total 59,562,635 )			
		2007				2008-11					Finan cRes.	Description of Budget	Amount	
		Q 1	Q 2	Q 3	Q 4	Q 1	Q 2	Q 3	Q 4					
<b>Objective 1: Initiate and implement regional, state and human security engendering economic projects for conflict resolution and state construction</b>														
<b>1.1 BOSERs, BOSEENs and BOSSONs and mobilization plan developed by governments</b>  <u>Benchmark indicators :</u>	1.1.1 36 cross-border sensitization meetings in zones with government officials and community leaders on the need to establish Border Security Roads (BOSER), Border Economic and Environmental Networks (BOSEEN) and Border Security Social Networks (BOSSON)												36 meetings x 10'000 USD each  30,000 US\$ per zone	360'000

# of decrees or signed instructions # of troops earmarked # of youths and ex-combatants listed	1.1.2 Mobilization of military engineering brigades, un-employed youths and demobilized soldiers in security generating economic activities.										GVT	GVT	Military units be used : such as various hardware like tractors and the necessary running costs provided (gvt. Meets costs), 3000 youth and ex-combatants x 11 countries x 54 months x 50 USD	53'460'00 0
	1.1.3 Identify military capacities in the region with respect to setting up BOSERS, BOSSONS and BOSEENS.													<i>These are preparatory activities to be carried out by each government at their own expenses.</i>
	1.1.4 Identify capacities and research institutes in GLR dealing with related issues of small business.													
	1.1.5 Promote networking among research institutes and scholars													
	1.1.6 Disseminate information and sensitize decision makers on Border economic zones and their roles in security generation.													
<b>Objective 2: Capacity building for the realization of security generating border economic zones</b>														
<b>2.1 Local officials, secretariats staff and other stakeholders efficient in implementing their role</b> Benchmark indicators : # of trained persons	2.1.1 Member countries of one zone jointly recruit one expert to develop and produce a training strategy and manual for zone specific BOSEENS and BOSSONS												1 experts for 2 months @ 10500 = 21,000; travel expenses (approx. 100 US\$ per day)	27'850

